simply by virtue of a superior rationality and do not depend for their impact on the lines of power and influence operating in an institution." The contrastive notion of "institutional authority" refers to the nonintellectual influence exerted by social, political, cultural, historical, legal, literary, educational, religious, and other institutions. The nonintellectual influence of intellectual institutions is a particularly interesting and perplexing subcategory of institutional authority. Law and literature, for example, both aspire (or have aspired) to be institutions in which intellectual authority is the coin of the realm.
In literary theory the classic claims to intellectual authority were articulated by Matthew Arnold, who emphasized in an oft-cited essay that
[L] aments about loss of authority... probably offer the key to what the debate is most profoundly about. The notion that study of the humanities used to represent, be based on, transmit, intellectual (and perhaps moral) authority reminds us that the humanities were traditionally held to represent the place of values in education.1 2 These claims and challenges suggest the parameters of the issues I shall be concerned with in this essay. Part I takes up the discussion of intellectual authority that has been pursued in legal and literary theory and points out the inadequacies of that discussion in the light of a broader view of intellectual history. Part II considers empirical studies of the phenomenon of institutional authority. Finally, Part III offers a positive and reconstructive vision of intellectual authority based on attempts to eliminate the effects of institutional authority. 
I. Does Intellectual Authority Exist?
Perhaps the most direct way to criticize, question, or challenge the distinction between intellectual and institutional authority is to deny that intellectual authority even exists; and one way to explore the phenomenon of intellectual authority is to examine the arguments of those who have denied that it exists. Stanley Fish, for example, dismisses "the authority exerted by arguments that make their way simply by virtue of a superior rationality and do not depend for their impact on the lines of power and influence operating in an institution" and declares: "That kind of authority, I submit, does not exist." 14 Intellectual authority is said by Fish not to exist because it is dependent on and inseparable from institutional authority:
(I] nstitutional facts are not external to the issue of intellectual authority, because the very shape of intellectual authority-in the form of "powerful" arguments and "decisive" evidence and "compelling" reasons-has been established (not for all time, but for a season) by the same processes that have established these facts .... 21
But this claim quickly breaks down, once a sufficiently broad historical perspective is taken. Fish's concept of intellectual authority is too narrow and 12. Peter Brooks, Western Civ at Bay, Times Literary Supp.,Jan. 25, 1991, at 5 (book review); cf.
Roger Kimball, Letter to the Editor, Times Literary Supp., Feb. 8, 1991, at 14; Norman F. Cantor, Letter to the Editor, Times Literary Supp., Apr. 5, 1991, at 15; John Searle, The Storm over the University, N.Y. Rev. Books, Dec. 6, 1990, at 34 (book review); 'The Storm over the University': An Exchange, N.Y. Rev. Books, Feb. 14, 1991, at 48; C. Vann Woodward, Freedom & the Universities, N.Y. Rev. Books, July 18, 1991, at 32 (book review). 13. In this relatively short essay it will be necessary to introduce certain simplling assumptions and distinctions that concededly do not capture the full complexity of the issues involved and that may suggest a neglect of historical conditions and context. For example, I shall inquire whether intellectual authority "exists" or "does not exist," whether certain authors are "right" or "wrong," and whether scholarly works are accepted for publication on the basis of their "intellectual content" as opposed to extraneous "institutional factors." I make these simplifying assumptions and distinctions in the hope that they will help clear the ground for more detailed, nuanced, and contextual work, which may eventually qualify the conclusions I reach here. It will be sufficient for present purposes if my arguments are persuasive at the level of generality at which they are made. 14. Stanley Fish, Fish v. Fiss, 36 Stan. L. Rev. 1325 Rev. , 1342 Rev. (1984 .
Id. at 1342-43.
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short-term (note his disclaimer, "not for all time, but for a season"); it does not guard against fads, frauds, and fashions, which may well hold sway "for a season."
Thus, one way of criticizing Fish is to note that he fails to differentiate between the long term and the short term. In the long term, it may well be true that "there are no goals and reasons that are not institutional, that do not follow from the already-in-place assumptions, stipulated definitions, and categories of understanding of a socially organized activity." 1 6 An alleged "musical genius" who has never-i.e., over the course of centuries-gained the respect and recognition of other (institutionally) acknowledged musical geniuses is probably not a true musical genius. But "goals and reasons" that are in harmony with an institution's long-term "assumption's, stipulated definitions, and categories of understanding" may well conflict with the currently prevailing institutional consensus. The long run and the short run may diverge. In other words, the institutional imprimatur is no guarantee of intellectual authority (at least not in the short term); and true intellectual authority does not always promptly bring in its wake the institutional imprimatur.
Simply equating truth with institutional consensus would be, as Richard Posner rightly observes, a big mistake. It is not misusing the word "true" to say that "everyone except me believes the proposition p, but p is not true." Indeed, it would stifle inquiry to suppose that when consensus was achieved, truth had been found. The challenging of settled beliefs is an essential spur to intellectual progress. And this implies that settled beliefs are often false, as of course they are.1 7
The "intergenerational" consensus fortifies (or dispels) the momentary consensus of one generation; it varies the conditions and adds more perspectives and informed opinions, much as broader statistical sampling eventually confirms (or dilutes) the "interesting" pattern or tendency discerned in a small sample. This has sometimes been referred to as "the test of time." 18 In discussing standards of intellectual merit and worth, Fish says that "it is only with reference to the articulation and hierarchies of a professional bureaucracy that a sense of the self and its worth-its merit-emerges and becomes measurable."
19 This is obviously problematic for the short term, and it is just as obvious that Fish has the short term in mind: "[T]he very shape of intellectual authority ... has been established (not for all time, but for a season) by institutional processes... ." 0 Nothing, however, is more common in intellectual history than temporarily unrecognized worth, merit, or even greatness. 16 . Stanley Fish, Anti-Professionalism, 7 Cardozo L. Rev. 645, 673-74 (1986 Schopenhauer made an important distinction in his Aphorisms on Life's Wisdom between "fame" and "that through which one earns it." 2 ' Clearly, the two do not always coincide. As Lessing observed, "Some people are famous, and others deserve to be"--but are not. 22 What does it mean to say that someone can "deserve" to be famous without actually being famous? It means that desert, merit, value, and intellectual authority can exist and be assessed independently of the prevailing institutional context. Fish repeatedly denies this-for him, "[t]hat kind of authority... does not exist"2-but history clearly shows otherwise. In fact, many of the most obvious discrepancies between intellectual and institutional authority have been corrected only gradually and grudgingly, over long-often desolate-historical expanses. Plato had Socrates say at his trial, after being condemned to death: "Well, gentlemen, for the sake of a very small gain in time you are going to earn the reputation-and the blame from those who wish to disparage our city-of having put Socrates to death, 'that wise man'-because they will say I am wise even if I am not, these peopl who want to find fault with you."2 5 Bruno was burned alive at the stake in 1600 for various scientific heresies, yet "his conception is so powerful and so prophetic, so reasonable and so poetic that ... we cannot but assign to Bruno a very important place in the history of the human mind."2 6 Shakespeare's dramas "had, immediately after his death, to give place to those of Benjonson, Massinger, Beaumont and Fletcher, and to yield the supremacy for a hundred years."7 During his lifetime, Bacon got no help from any public or private person for his instauration of the sciences .... A generation was to elapse before scientists, at home and abroad, hailing Bacon as a "new Aristotle" and "nature's secretary," undertook at his bidding and according to his directions the collecting of myriad natural histories. ' Descartes was " [t] anticipating the brilliant success that his opinions would one day have."
29
Although Newton lived for almost forty years after the appearance of the Principia, "his teaching was, when he died, only to some extent accepted in his own country, whilst outside England he counted scarcely twenty adherents." 3 0
Leibniz "felt keenly the neglect in which his last years were passed," and "[n] either at Berlin, in the academy which he had founded, nor in London, whither his sovereign had gone to rule, was any notice taken of his death."
31
Mozart was buried in an unmarked common grave, and "no one, for years, cared to find out where Mozart was buried: as a result, we know only the approximate section of the cemetery under which, somewhere, music's greatest genius lies." 32 Fish wants to claim, in effect, that "truth claims" are indexed to very small or short units of time. Earlier (in acknowledging that such claims are indeed indexed to time, but only in the long run) I stated that an "alleged 'musical genius' who has never-i.e., over the course of centuries--gained the respect and recognition of other (institutionally) acknowledged musical geniuses is probably not a true musical genius." Fish might respond that the identification of the proper unit of time is itself institutionally rather than intellectually driven. What, indeed, makes centuries a privileged unit of time? Why not use, say, millennia? From the perspective of future millennia, the entire past few centuries of musical history might seem as short and unrepresentative as Mozart's life-span seems to us.
One answer is that if we had millennia we could use millennia. (Indeed, in the case of literature or philosophy, that might be the better perspective.) But the very idea of "music," as we know and recognize it, has a definite, finite history. It is possible that later ages will consider our "music" to be nothing more than a quaint relic or historical curiosity. In the meantime, though, there is still an important difference between saying "During his lifetime, Mozart was not appreciated, but in the centuries since then he has come to be recognized as one of music's greatest geniuses," and saying "Mozart has been 29. D'Alembert, supra note 28, at 78; cf. id. at 77 (Descartes "experienced even in his own life what ordinarily happens to any man who has too marked an ascendancy over others. He had few enthusiasts and many enemies.").
30.
Schopenhauer, supra note 27, at 68; cf. Giacomo Leopardi, Parini's Discourse on Glory, in Essays and Dialogues, trans. Giovanni Cecchetti, 245 (Berkeley, 1982) ("Descartes, who marvelously broadened the field of geometry by applying algebra to it and by other means, was understood by only a few of his contemporaries. The same was the case with Newton."). .157 considered a musical genius for the last few centuries, but there is no telling what future millennia will think." The latter perspective makes all discussion (of Mozart at least) pointless, and no competent scholar of Mozart would adopt it. What is needed is a perspective "of the middle range," a perspective from which one can say that Mozart's contemporaries were mistaken or misguided, without worrying about the perspective of God. (These issues are discussed in more detail toward the end of Part III.)
13
In law, the conceptual analogue to "the test of time" is the doctrine of precedent, according to which the mere fact that ajudge has decided a case a certain way (and afortiori if subsequentjudges have followed that decision) is itself a reason for deciding later cases the same way.
3 3 At first glance, this practice appears to reflect no more than the exercise of pure institutional authority, which perhaps explains Oliver Wendell Holmes's famous protest that "[i] t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV."3 In a very real sense the conflict between intellectual authority and institutional authority is played out in the reconsideration and overruling of legal decisions.
What does it mean to say that ajudicial decision has not withstood the test of time? It might mean (as ChiefJustice Rehnquist suggests) that it was "badly reasoned," 35 or even (asJustice Souter writes) that the case was simply 'wrongly decided."36 These would be claims that the validity ofjudicial decision making indeed rests on what I have termed intellectual authority: "badly reasoned" or 'wrongly decided" cases get no help from the doctrine of precedent; they stand or fall strictly on their intellectual merits. Yet an alternative and perhaps deeper gloss has always seen in the precipitate overruling of recent decisions a distinctly anti-intellectual, willful, unabashedly "political" force at work, and it is easy to multiply examples to which this reading convincingly applies.
37
Claims of reasonable reliance and the need for stability and predictability in legal doctrine clearly must be recognized too, though the policy discussion of those issues ranges too far afield to be discussed adequately here.ss Suffice it to say, however, thatJustice Brandeis went to the institutional extreme in maintaining that "in most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right." his intermediate position grants to judicial precedents a certain presumption of institutional inertia, subject only to critical reexamination and an intellectual check in the long run, if and as relevant conditions change.
In addition to "precedential authority" there is another, more direct form of authority wielded in the law: the machinery of a court that backs up judicial decrees and secures compliance with them. According to Fish, influential scholars have this kind of authority too:
They can influence decisions about tenure, promotion, publications, grants, leaves, appointments, prizes, teaching assignments, etc. Although the "compliance" secured by these and other means is more diffuse and less direct than the compliance secured by ajudge, it is rooted in authority nevertheless, and this authority, like that wielded in the law, is at once intellectual and institutional.
4 ' Fish's discussion seems to suggest that intellectual authority may sometimes be accompanied by institutional authority, which is not surprising. But that does not mean that there is no such thing as intellectual authority (which Fish says "does not exist"). Owen Fiss is also on shaky ground in claiming that "the claim of authoritativeness, whether it be predicated on virtue or power... is sufficient to distinguish the judge from the literary critic or moral philosopher who must rely on intellectual authority alone." 42 Unlike law, which has institutional authority even if it lacks intellectual authority (e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson), in the humanities one can have intellectual authority without institutional authority (e.g., Socrates), or one can have both (Fish's point) .4 So, Fiss errs in suggesting that institutional and intellectual authority can never be together; Fish errs in suggesting that they can never be apart.
Fish implies that the institutional authority of influential scholars is, so to speak, coextensive with their intellectual authority (or perhaps even contributes to it): the "weight" of their influence is "inseparable from the 'intellectual ' The archetypal image of intellectual authority is that of the blindfolded woman holding scales and sword and administering justice "without fear or favor." Self-imposed blindness is indeed a valued procedure for ensuring fairness and impartiality as well as a splendid metaphor for abstracting from irrelevant or biasing "institutional" factors. Well-known examples include Rawls's "veil of ignorance," 4 6 the standard "double blind" experimental procedure, 47 the secret ballot, the use of anonymous examination numbers, 48 the numbered protocols used in professional wine tasting andjudging, and "blind reviewing" of manuscripts by scholarly journals. 49 Other well-known ways of ensuring that decisions are made on the basis of intellectual merit are conflictof-interest rules, 50 these are standard practices or unwritten, unspoken rules; they are commonplaces of life as we know it. It is almost as though Fish is simply ignorant of or (more likely) uninterested in the elementary rules of human psychology, such as the fact that people tend to favor their "home team" (no matter how bad it is) and to think less highly of "outsiders.' But instead of simply viewing Fish as incredibly naive, one may also view him as stubbornly challenging the whole theoretical basis of intellectual authority and of attempts to eliminate the "bias" of institutional authority. That sort of challenge would merit a considered response. Fortunately, these matters have been studied extensively and submitted to rigorous empirical and experimental scientific examination. The following sections analyze the results of that scientific work.
H. Social Science and the Empirical Study of Institutional Authority
A. Judgmental Heuristics or "Rules of Thumb"
Consider the case of Ann, who is trying to decide how to invest her money.
55
Late one night a friend presents her with what appears, potentially at least, to be an excellent investment opportunity. Unfortunately, however, the offer is a very complicated one, it must be decided on that very night, and Ann is very tired and sleepy. She tells her friend that she is too tired and sleepy to make a decision. He points out that not deciding is tantamount to deciding to reject the offer, which may be a very good one. Ann replies that she is not rejecting the offer on its merits but because she cannot trust her own judgment at the moment. Her friend responds that this is unreasonable because it violates the following principle of rational decision making: One ought always, all things considered, to do whatever one ought to do on the balance of reasons. Being tired, sleepy, and out of time do not bear on the merits of the investment proposition, but Ann insists that they are reasons-though not the sort recognized in her friend's principle of rational decision making-for not considering the merits of the offer, i.e., for not acting "on the balance of reasons." In a sense, she claims to be rationallyjustified in not acting completely "rationally." Ann, we may say, is acting on a heuristic or "rule of thumb" (probably something like: "When you can't properly evaluate an investment offer, reject it") .56 These are time-and labor-saving devices that usually, though not always, help us avoid serious error. In any event, they spare us the trouble of reexamining every new situation afresh on its merits. 57 "Fact-finding and evaluating the different reasons for action consume time and effort and these are costs which even under conditions of infallibility will often outweigh the marginal benefits which in many cases ensue from engaging in a complete assessment of the situation on its merits."asEven under conditions of complete rationality and complete information, then, there would still be a need for heuristics or rules of thumb. Nevertheless, this does not mean that there are not better or worse rules of thumb, or that we cannot critically examine and improve them, or that we should not carefully avoid extending them beyond their range of valid application, or that there are only rules of thumb (Fish's position, in effect).
B. The Problem of Bias and the "Halo Effect"
The analysis of heuristics and rules of thumb is brought into somewhat sharper focus with the documentation of the halo effect, which has been studied extensively by social psychologists. With the halo effect, a positive overall impression is illegitimately extended to judgments of specific attributes, or one form of excellence or superiority is presumed to implicate others (even when it really does not, as can be determined by separate and independent measurement).
The halo effect may be thought of as a special case of the phenomena which result from the logical eror--the tendency to see different traits as "belonging together" when they logically do not .... When the halo effect occurs, the error consists of assuming the presence of many positive traits from the existence of one favorable characteristic., 9 As early as 1920 Edward Thorndike found a "constant error toward suffusing ratings of special features with a halo belonging to the individual as a whole."60 Even very conscientious army officers who were asked to rate their subordinates as to intelligence, physique, leadership, and character were "unable to analyze out these different aspects of the person's nature and achievement and rate eaGh in independence of the others." 61 The correlations 57. SeeJohn Stuart Mill, A System of Logic, 9th ed., bk. 6, ch. 12, § 3, at 549 (London, 1875): By a wise practitioner... rules ofconductwill only be considered as provisional.
Being made for the most numerous cases, or for those of most ordinary occurrence, they point out the manner in which it will be least perilous to act, where time or means do not exist for analysing the actual circumstances of the case, or where we cannot trust our judgment in estimating them.
58. Raz, supra note 55, at 60; cf. Lola L. Lopes, The Rhetoric of Irrationality, 1 Theory & Psychol. 65, 68 (1991) ("In broad terms, heuristic methods are quick-and-not-too-dirty procedural tricks that usually yield acceptable solutions to problems at noticeably less cost than is required by alternative methods (called algorithms) that guarantee optimal solutions. In other words, heuristics are methods that achieve efficiency by risking failure."). In other studies of the halo effect, the general reputation of various countries' products has been shown to affect specific product evaluations; when consumers were not familiar with a certain brand, "country image" served as a halo under which they formed an attitude. 64 Another common finding is that physical attractiveness produces a halo that favorably influences impressions of talent, kindness, honesty, and intelligence.65 An "institutional halo" has been shown to dominate the rankings of individual programs or departments of universities, and sometimes very prestigious universities have been highly rated for programs or departmeiits that they do not even have166 In one study, Harvard, Stanford, Columbia, Chicago, and Northwestern were named as having undergraduate business schools among the twelve best in the nation by senior personnel executives, who "unfortunately overlook[ed] the fact that none of these institutions even has an undergraduate school of business .... The ranking of five universities without business programs among schools with the best undergraduate business programs is powerful evidence that the halo effect influences rankings."
67 These are just a few of the many areas in which the halo effect has been observed and documented as a basic factor in human psychology.'
C. The Study of Obedience in Social Psychology
The study of obedience in social psychology brings the empirical study of institutional authority into even sharper focus. Milgram showed the remarkable extent to which the halo of "scientific authority" obscured and distorted human judgment on matters of life and death. Milgram recruited unsuspecting volunteers to assume the role of a "teacher" in a test of learning. The "teacher" was asked to pose a series of prepared questions to a "learner" and to administer an electrical shock to the learner if he answered incorrectly. Milgram presented the experiment to the teacher as a study of the effects of punishment, or "negative reinforcement," on memory and learning. Actually, Milgran was testing the teacher for his willingness to administer the electrical shocks. The "learner" was a trained actor and a member of the experimental team who did not actually receive any shocks, although almost all the teachers thought he did.
7 '
Milgram's experiments demonstrate the important effects of institutional authority on judgment and obedience. The remarkable level of obediencewhich was consistently higher, by degrees of magnitude, than what trained psychologists predicted beforehand-depended on the extent to which the subjects perceived their actions as subject to that authority. 71. See Milgram, Obedience to Authority, supra note 69, at 171-74. The "shocks" were given in a sequence running from 15 to 450 volts in 15-volt intervals. Id. at 20. The voltage levels were clearly displayed on the experimental apparatus used by the teacher, as were verbal designations ranging from "slight shock" (15-60 volts) to "danger: severe shock" (375-420 volts). Id. at 20, 29. For every wrong answer, the next highest shock in the series was to be administered. Id. at 20-21.
The most important version of the experiment was one in which the teacher could hear the learner's verbal protests from an adjoining room. The learner's protests began at 120 volts with complaints, followed by demands to be released from the experiment (150 volts), agonized shouts (270 volts), refusal to answer further questions (300 volts), violent, vehement, and prolonged screams (315 volts), followed by dead silence thereafter (330 volts). Id. at 23.
In these circumstances, the average level of highest shock administered was 368 volts, and 25 out of 40 subjects proceeded all the way up to the maximum level of 450 volts. Id. at 35. Some continued to administer shocks on the assumption that the "learner" was by then dead. See i&L at 76, 87.
The experimental supervisor was an "impassive" and "somewhat stem" man dressed in a grey technician's coat. Id. at 16. If the subjects hesitated before administering a shock, the supervisor would calmly advise them that they were required to continue, and that the shocks, though painful, would cause "no permanent tissue damage." Id. at 19, 21. Further, when the subjects hesitated, the supervisor would respond with a carefully tailored oral "prod," ranging from "Please continue," to "You have no other choice, you must go on." The supervisor maintained at all times a professional, "scientific" manner and always spoke in an even, unemotional tone of voice. Id. at 21.
72. See id. at 153-64; id. at 27-31 (in separate surveys, psychiatrists, college students, and middleclass adults predicted, on average, that the maximum shock level they themselves would administer in the experiment would be about 120-35 volts; when asked to predict how other people would perform, "[tlhey predict that virtually all subjects will refuse to obey the experimenter, only a pathological fringe, not exceeding one or two per cent, was expected to proceed to the end of the shockboard. explanations for the results-e.g., the view that people are naturally cruel or sadistic-were disproved by careful variations of the basic experiment in which the subjects were able to choose whatever level of punishment they deemed appropriate. 7 3 "With numbing regularity," observed Milgram, ordinary, decent, and responsible citizens were "seduced by the trappings of authority," by the control of their perceptions, and by their "uncritical acceptance of the experimenter's definition of the situation" into performing harsh and punitive acts they otherwise would never have performed. 74 Milgram induced in his subjects the impression that their actions were "mandated" by" authority when, in fact, their participation in the experiment was wholly voluntary and could be terminated by them at any time.
5
Milgram's experiments were conducted in a modem scientific laboratory by trained technicians who presided over a formidable array of scientific equipment. Undoubtedly, this environment enhanced the "halo" of authority and contributed to the results. The "teachers'" expectations in these circumstances must have been that the "authorities" exercised rightful control and legitimate power. These expectations were reinforced for the subjects by the apparently logical connection between the actions they were being asked to perform and the scientific goal of increasing knowledge about the nature of memory and learning.
7 6 In short, "Milgram found that a sufficiently 'institu-73. These versions served as a crucial control on the experimental findings. Milgram, Obedience to Authority, supra note 69, at 70-72. In the "control" situation "the great majority of subjects delivered the very lowest shocks to the victim when the choice was left up to them." Id. at 72.
74.
Id. at 123.
Id. at 40-41:
The over-all level of obedience, across all four experimental variations, requires comment. Subjects have learned from childhood that it is a fundamental breach of moral conduct to hurt another person against his will. Yet, almost half the subjects ibandon this tenet in following the instructions of an authority who has no special powers to enforce his commands. To disobey would bring no material loss or punishment.
See also id. at 51. In perhaps the most pitiful and telling reaction to this false sense of obligation, many of Milgram's subjects offered to return the $4.50 they had already been paid for participating, if only they could discontinue shocking what they thought was a dying man. When the offers were refused, they continued their grim task. Id. at 47.
76. Although particular instructibns of the authorities might be questioned in this context, in some sense they all seem at least "rationally related" to the general goal of scientific progress. Cf. id. at 141, 176, 187, 208 n.14. Residual, "background" authority is supplied in turn by such intangibles as a general ideological climate favorable to science as well as the "broad institutional accord" that permits such activities to go on at all (e.g., the social approval implied in the very fact that the experiment was being conducted and tolerated in a civilized country Milgram's experiments were also conducted in an atmosphere of great pressure, both temporal and psychological. The experiments were very smoothly run, highly engineered, "slick" productions. They took place over a thirtyminute time period, in a confined and narrow context that afforded no time for thought, no opportunity for exploration or reflection.
7 8 It may be that Milgram's results are strictly limited to these conditions; under these conditions, and perhaps only under these conditions, subjects rely on institutional authority to the extent documented by Milgram.
Yet this is not as great a limitation as it might at first seem. As explained above, the reliance on heuristics and "rules of thumb" would be totally unjustified only "when one has all the time in the world on hand, can call on the advice of the best experts, and when using up time, and the time of experts, has no other undesirable results."
79 Needless to say, such conditions rarely if ever obtain. Even under relatively normal circumstances, the claims of institutional authority carry at least provisional justification. Following the advice of better informed and more experienced "authorities" (who cannot or will not share their information and experience with us) spares us the time and trouble of reexamining every decision on the merits au fond. Further, coordinating the actions of many people may be possible only if they delegate some authority of decision and surrender some rights to assess the soundness of various courses of action and to determine for themselves what to do. 0 Under these relatively normal conditions, the fact that a superior has issued a command or order is a reason, though not necessarily an overriding reason, for obeying it; and it is a reason that does not go to the merits of the decision in the sense of rationallyjustifying it "on the balance of reasons."
In other words, yielding to the advice or commands of authorities is another practical heuristic or "rule of thumb." Even under normal conditions we are often justified (in this sense) in following institutional authority. The pressure, temporal as well as psychological, generated in the Milgram experiments is not an ancillary or incidental but rather an integral and exemplary feature of our relationship to authority. Milgram's experiments simply show what happens in the extreme case, and they demonstrate the extreme danger inherent in the complete and uncritical reliance on institutional authority. 8 In an earlier study I explored the legal implications of Milgram's experiments and showed how the halo of judicial authority influences jury decision making in a closely analogous way. 82 .The "darker side" of scientific authority documented by Milgram is indeed merely a special case of what I have termed "institutional authority." The biasing halo of institutional science's "trappings of authority" operates very much like that of the judiciary to secure a form and degree of compliance that cannot be justified on intellectual grounds and does not stand up to even the most rudimentary intellectual scrutiny. In another previous study I documented in some detail my suggestion that the authority of adjudication is largely, if not exclusively, "institutional" in nature. 83 But these conclusions are already intimated in the social scientific documentation of the "halo effect"; and Milgram's studies provide final and deeply disturbing demonstrations of the vulnerability and frailty of human intellectual judgment in the face of a powerful show of institutional authority. Thus, far from being unproblematic or even benign, institutional authority poses enduring and perplexing problems in a number of important contexts.
84
I. The "Veil of Ignorance" as a Test of Intellectual Authority I turn now from the pervasive influence of institutional authority, as documented by empirical social science, to some attempts to eliminate the bias of institutional authority. One of the most famous (and most general) attempts to isolate and eliminate bias,.interests, and other forms of institutional authority from the process of intellectual deliberation is to be found inJohn Rawls's A Theoy ofJustice.8 5 In that work Rawls elaborates, as a key methodological assumption, the notion of a "veil of ignorance" that will surround participants in a hypothetical debate over the optimal polity. Rawls's aim is to "generalize and carr[y] to a higher level of abstraction" traditional theories of the social contract. To do this, "we are not to think of the original contract as one to enter a particular society or to set up a particular form of government." Rather, the objects of the original agreement are the principles ofjustice "that free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamental terms of their association. course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception ofjustice." 7 In this original position, the principles of justice are chosen behind a "veil of ignorance" so that those choosing them will not be swayed or influenced by "the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances."ss In Rawls's scheme, the parties to this deliberation on justice do not know their place in society, their natural assets and abilities, or even their conceptions of the good or their own psychological propensities.
Rawls makes abundantly clear that his self-imposed "veil of ignorance" is a hypothetical construct unavailable in the real world.
9 But his methods have important, real applications, and one of the most obvious of these is the practice of "blind reviewing," the practice of evaluating manuscripts without knowing the identity of the author. The practice of blind reviewing is endorsed by numerous professional associations and leading scholarly journals and publishers; it is a prime example of the evidently felt need to combat the biasing effect or "taint" of scholarly institutional authority. 90 Blind reviewing is undertaken and endorsed in the conviction that considerations of institutional authority are wholly extraneous to intellectual merit. Clearly, this is an issue of the first importance, because the editorial practices and assumptions determining what will be published serve, in effect, as preconditions for the dissemination of ideas, scholarship, and ultimately knowledge itself.
As it happens, I have had an opportunity to observe the law review article selection process at first hand. As an article editor of the Stanford Law Review I proposed in early 1984 that the Review adopt the practice of blind reviewing. The proposal was not adopted, because it was felt that "we don't have enough time." At that time, the Review received approximately 750 submissions each year, out of which only a dozen or so could be accepted for publication. As a short cut, about half of the submitted articles were rejected unread on the basis of inappropriate methodology or subject matter or even title. 91 
See Stanford Law Review Handbook 12 (1984):
When an article reaches the Review, it is "prescreened" by an article editor. This is a 15-20 minute review to determine the article's scope, sophistication, and interest to our readers. About half of the articles submitted to the Review pass the prescreen and are then read by one or two editors-the first and second "reads"--who then report on the article in the weekly department meeting. Less than 10% of all the articles submitted survive to a "third read" by all the article editors and the president, and of these, only 10-12 are selected annually.
following examples are taken almost at random from my advance sheets (1989) ). The issue consists of three short memorials, two lengthy articles, seven student notes, and a book review. Two of the memorials are written by Harvard law profess6rs and the third is by a former Harvard law professor, they are writing in memory of a former Harvard law professor who was previously president of the Harvard Law Review. The two lead articles are both written by Harvard law professors. (In perhaps the ultimate exercise of institutional privilege, the author of the first article spends the last 10 of his 75 pages publicly pondering whether he should even publish his Harvard Law Review article at all, considering that he has been advised not to; in the end he decides to "takte] the risk that some of my ideas will be misappropriated." Id. at 1812.) The author of the book review is a former book review editor of the Harvard Law Review who is reviewing a book (published by Harvard University Press) written by a former president of the Harvard Law Review. At the front of the issue appears the following notice, under the heading "Information for Contributors": 'The Review invites the submission of unsolicited manuscripts. Please confine author's name and biographical information to a removable title page." Id. at ii.
One does not have to be a particularly astute student of human psychology to understand why the pages of the leading law reviews are so disproportionately filled by professors at those very same institutions. One need only have been a student. (Purely statistically, the odds of placing three successive articles in the same leading law review would be the proverbial "one in a million," assuming a 1% acceptance rate; amazingly, these staggering odds are routinely defied at. the leading law schools and law reviews.)
A full explanation, however, must go beyond the obvious power (real and imagined) that professors wield over their students. The situation is, more precisely, one of implicit mutual admiration, dependency, and usefulness-of "one hand washing the other." The real losers are, of course, the law reviews (which end up publishing inferior work) and the "outsiders" (whose work ends up systematically underplaced).
We need a new canon of professional and ethical responsibility to address this problem. I have in mind something like the following: "Submitting a manuscript for consideration by a law review or other journal at one's own institution is a primafacie violation of professional responsibility and an inherently unethical practice." a regime of blind reviewing. 94 These experiences were evidently not unrepresentative. A leading study of law review publishing practices. has concluded that "the major law reviews publish the work of their own faculty disproportionately often." 95 The study found that the leading law reviews consistently devoted 20 percent, 30 percent, even 40 percent of their scarce space to the work of "in-house" authors. When viewed as a percentage of faculty publishing, the in-house data are even more staggering; authors at the leading law schools routinely published 60 94. It might be objected that the first "short cut"-rejecting articles unread on the basis of inappropriate title, etc.-would still be possible even if the identities and institutions of the authors were unknown. However, even that aspect of the review process would be significanty altered in a regime of blind reviewing. The important "confirmation" that an outlandishly titled article was indeed the work of an unknown at Slippery Rock State Technical Community College, for example, would no longer be available. That, in turn, might necessitate further examination of the piece on its merits.
Ira Mark Ellman, A Comparison of Law Faculty Production in Leading Law Reviews, 33J.
Legal Educ. 681, 692 (1983); cf. id. at 681 ("in-house publishing is common and sometimes dominant among leading schools"); id. at 688-89 ("because of the prevalence of in-house publishing," the determination of the most productive faculties "is heavily influenced by the initial selection ofjournals"). The study surveyed the leading 23 law reviews, as measured by citation frequency, between 1979 and 1982. See id. at 681-82 for a discussion of the methodology.
96.
See id. at 685, On the basis of these and related data, the study identified two sources of "potential bias" in the article selection process:
First, most law journals, unlike the professional journals in many other fields, do not review articles anonymously. For that reason, authors affiliated with the most established institutions may well have their pieces reviewed with more care. Second, faculty at schools with journals sampled in this study may have an advantage in placing their pieces in their home journal. Many of these journals devote a high proportion of their pages to their own faculty. This potential bias favors faculty at the nineteen schools that publish the journals surveyed in this study; these schools also tend to be established.98
These forms of reliance on "institutional authority" are to be expected when the volume of submitted manuscripts effectively precludes in-depth evaluation: "With serious substantive review impossible, authors' credentials have assumed greater importance than they should in the evaluation process." ' 97. See id. at 687, The "graduate school model" for scholarly publication... generally mandates blind reviews by professional referees. The underlying rationale, of course, is that knowledge of authorship can seriously bias the review process. If manuscript quality is all that is at issue, the reviewer's knowledge of the author's publications, rank, and affiliations can only be irrelevant and prejudicial. It is ironic that the publication mode for law should ignore this basic principle of evidence....
[T] he lack of blind review seriously compromises the credibility of the manuscript review process.
99. Jensen, supra note 90, at 383; see also id. at 385: The legal publication system is, to put it bluntly, absurd....
[U]nder the circumstances, student editors' overreliance on authors' credentials is quite reasonable. To get the stack of manuscripts to a manageable level, editors need some winnowing criterion; credentials, which bear some relationship to the quality of authors' past work, serve that function.
And if, as a former president of the Association of American Law Schools has suggested, "[t]he claim that student editors can recognize whether scholarly articles make an original contribution throughout the domain of the law is now viewed by legal scholars as indefensible,"'00 the reliance on indicia of institutional authority is only to be expected. In summary, three specific circumstances of student-edited law reviews (lack of time, lack of expertise, lack of independence) dictate reliance on three specific-and often overlapping-forms of institutional authority (well-known authors, authors affiliated with well-known institutions, in-house authors)."'l Now, it would be truly remarkable if there were absolutely no relationship between the academic reputation and prestige of an institution and the quality of articles written by professors at that institution. But it would be perhaps even more remarkable if the correlation were perfect. 02 The problem of bias arises when an intuitively reasonable approximation (a heuristic or "rule of thumb") is relied on beyond the scope of its validity.1 0 3 The reason that we must often act on unsubstantiated claims of authority, for example (or reject investment offers presented late at night), is the same reason that the Stanford Law Review article editors consciously relied on the halo effect: 'We don't have enough time." When modem life produces too many stimuli and too much information for us to process at once, it may be adaptive to adopt simplifying rules or stereotypes.10 "Because of limited information-processing abilities.., humans have to construct simplified models of the world. Heuris-100. Roger C. Cramton, "The Most Remarkable Institution": The American Law Review, 36J.
Legal Educ. 1, 7-8 (1986); cf. id. at 7: Probably it was never true that a second-year law student, on the basis of high intelligence and a year's training in the parsing of cases, could deal with any problem of traditional doctrinal scholarship. But this myth ofomnicompetence clearly has no validity today, when the most experienced and able faculty members do not claim competence over the entire realm of legal scholarship. Law today is too complex and specialized; and legal scholarship is too theoretical and interdisciplinary.
101. I do not mean to suggest that these problems are confined to student-edited journals. The Supreme Court Review, for example, is a faculty-edited journal published at the University of Chicago Law School that solicits and assigns articles in advance. The Supreme Court Review prides itself on its "willingness to seek not only diversity, but to encourage young scholars" and even to publish "good work by obscure authors." Preface, 1989 Sup. Ct. Rev. at ix. In the same issue of the Review in which those statements appeared, however, eight out of the twelve articles were authored by current or (after eight years of blind reviewing, the pages of PMLA "now house more women, more colleagues from the junior ranks, and authors from a greater variety of institutions").
103. See Cialdini, supra note 65, at 5-9. tics are a product of these; they are short cuts that can produce efficient decisions."105
Fortunately, these problems have been submitted to direct empirical examination in the context of blind reviewing.1° In the leading study, Peters and Ceci tested the "halo effect" of institutional authority on scholarly publishing in the field of psychology (where, if anywhere, it would presumably be detected) .107 Peters and Ceci randomly selected one leading article, published in the preceding 18-32 months, from each of twelve leading psychology journals that did not practice blind reviewing. The journals were all "solid, mainstream"journals that were "among the most prestigious journals in psychology," as measured by citation frequency studies, and the average acceptance rate for manuscripts submitted to them was about twenty percent. 108 The twelve articles were above average in citation frequency both for the journals they appeared in and for the social sciences generally.
1 9 "The only constraint on the selection was that.., at least one of the original authors of each article had to have been affiliated with an institution with a high-ranking department of psychology in terms of prestige ratings, productivity, and faculty citations."" 0 Peters and Ceci changed the names (but not the sex) and institutional affiliations of the authors, substituting for Harvard, Stanford, University of California, and the like, the names of fictitious institutions "without meaning or status in psychology," such as Tri-Valley Center for Human Potential, Tri-Valley Institute of Growth and Understanding, and Northern Plains Research Station.' Peters and Ceci then had the articles retyped and resubmitted to the same journals that had published them originally.
Peters and Ceci's results are nothing short of remarkable. All but one of the twelve articles were rejected by the same journals in which they had previously appeared, including eight of the nine articles that went through the review process undetected as resubmissions. 112 Sixteen of the eighteen referees (89 percent) recommended against publication, and the editors concurred with those recommendations in every case. Furthermore, the articles were rejected "primarily for reasons of methodology and statistical treatment, not because reviewers judged that the work was not new." 1 1 Various resubmitted articles were said by the journals' reviewers to have "serious methodological flaws" that led the editors to "doubt that any revision would alter this decision."" 4 These results are all the more remarkable when one considers that the resubmitted articles were the final, polished, published versions-which if anything should have made them better, not worse, than the versions the original reviewers saw.
But, of course, the real reason the resubmitted articles were "worse" is that two important variables were changed: the authors' names and institutional affiliations. Seen in that light, Peters and Ceci's results are not remarkable at all. Who would expect anything good-let alone brilliant-from an unknown at the "Northern Plains Research Station"? Who would expect important and original research, at the "cutting edge" of psychology, to emerge from so unlikely a place as the 'Tri-Valley Center for Human Potential"? Is it any surprise that the second sets of reviewers were "in agreement that there were serious flaws in the articles-perhaps the stereotypic muddled thinking of authors associated with a Tri-Valley Institute of Growth and Understanding"?1 5 Thus, Peters and Ceci suggest as an explanation for their results the "possibility... that systematic bias was operating to produce the discrepant reviews. The most obvious candidates as sources of bias in this case would be the authors' status and institutional affiliation."" 6 Interestingly, Stanley Fish has written an article against blind reviewing, entitled "No Bias, No Merit: The Case Against Blind Submission.""' In it he comments tangentially on the Peters and Ceci study by quoting approvingly from a few critics of the study, one of whom remarks imperiously: "A reviewer may be justified in assuming at the outset that [well-known] people know what they are doing."" 8 Fish is nothing if not consistent. Indeed, he may be criticized as "overly consistent," so to speak-as having over-generalized from a few favorite theories and applied them at a level of specificity they do not warrant. To his credit, Fish candidly acknowledges at the outset his personal interest in opposing blind reviewing: "I am against blind submission because the fact that my name is attached to an article greatly increases its chances of getting accepted."
19 In other words, Fish's institutional authority makes up, to some degree, for weaknesses in the intellectual content of his work, thereby providing journals that would not otherwise publish his articles with an additional reason for doing so. (If institutional authority makes any difference-and Fish says it does-this is the difference it must make.) One infers that Fish's work is significantly overplaced on the merits, since attaching his name "greatly" increases its chances of getting accepted. In his defense, Fish elaborates that "I have paid my dues and earned the benefit of the doubt I now enjoy and don't see why others shouldn't labor in the vineyards as I did.""'
The usual-and obvious-purpose offered in support of blind reviewing is "to ensure that in making their evaluations readers are not influenced by factors other than the intrinsic merits of the article."' In other words, the. purpose is to ensure that papers are selected for publication on the strength of what I have termed their "intellectual authority" rather than on the "institutional authority" of such extraneous factors as title, position, and institution. Fish directly challenges these assumptions: "I want to argue, in short, that there is no such thing as intrinsic merit."
Fish's argument is as follows. True intellectual authority ("intrinsic merit") would imply the existence of "a standard or set of standards that operates independently of the institutional circumstances that have been labeled extraneous." 12 3 Fish argues that there is no such standard and that, even if there were, we violate it all the time anyway. (The argument consists mainly of deducing the first claim from various considerations in support of the second.)
We violate the "standard," says Fish, when we expect (demand) that an author exhibit familiarity with the whole body of previous scholarship relevant to new work in the author's chosen field. The new work must be "situated" in relation to that body of scholarship; it has a history, an etiology, and a pedigree. institutionally recognized ways. This is why (to use Fish's examples) articles entitled "What I Think about Middlemarch" or "The Waste Land and Me" would not be given a hearing-unless the author were already recognized as a leading authority (about which more later).
It appears that Fish may have confused a necessary condition with a sufficient one. It may well be necessary to invoke and advance the body of previous scholarship in order to get a hearing, but can one directly conclude, from this alone, that blind reviewing is useless (or "useless and worse than useless," as Langdell might have put it)? Fish's responses on this point are notably weak. He gives the example of a paper submitted for publication by the renowned Lord Rayleigh, from which the author's name had inadvertently been omitted; the paper was summarily rejected by the British Association as the work of "one of those curious persons called paradoxers."In But when Lord Rayleigh's name was subsequently restored, the paper was immediately accepted for publication "with profuse apologies.
" 126 Fish's analysis?
[S]horn of its institutional lineage the paper presented itself as without direction, and whimsical; but once the reviewers were informed of its source they were able to see it as the continuation of work--of lines of direction, routes of inquiry-they already knew, and all at once the paper made a different kind of sense than it did when they were considering it "blindly."'2
If anything, this explanation merely points up the obtuseness of the reviewers. As Fish concedes, "On its face this might seem to be a realization of the worst fears of those who argue for blind submission." 2 8 Indeed, Fish suggests no reason why it would make no "sense" for someone else to advance or continue Lord Rayleigh's work. And Fish also conspicuous!y fails to mention the original commentary on the episode, which is highly interesting in its own right: "However, when the authorship was discovered, the paper was found to have merits after all. It would seem that even in the late nineteenth century, and in spite of all that had been written by the apostles of free discussion, authority could prevail when argument had failedl" 19 Fish also dwells heavily on the lesson of C. S. Lewis as an "authority" on Milton. Lewis's condemnation of the final books of Paradise Lost 1 0 was the reigning judgment for a generation, but eventually it succumbed to the rehabilitative efforts of subsequent scholars, such that in 1972 Raymond Waddington could pronounce it, in effect, dead: "Few of us today could risk echoing C. S. Lewis's condemnation of the concluding books of Paradise Lost as an 'untransmuted lump of futurity.'" 5 ' "What this means," says Fish, "is that One is left to surmise that, given the then-prevailing literary climate, Lewis played his institutional cards right for a while and somehow managed to say the right thing at the right time; thereafter he was an "authority" and could get away with saying whatever he liked. In this context, of course, "saying the right thing" in no way implies saying what is "true" or "inherently" right, but rather what is "authorized," so to speak, by "prevailing institutional condiions'--"the safest thing the critic can say."1 3 7
Fish's position is untenable as a reading of intellectual history, of the process of intellectual influence, and even of the professional developments he reports. Specifically, he offers a faulty dichotomy in his discussion of intellectual "standards" that informed criticism rejects. For Fish, the choice is between a standard made "in eternity by God or by Aristotle" and the "prevailing institutional conditions . ..by which our labors will, for a time, be judged." 1 ss Since the first standard is obviously too high, Fish essentially concludes that there is no standard of intellectual authority. I say that Fish offers no standard because "prevailing institutional conditions" are about as close to no standard as one can get. These conditions will prevail "for a time," says Fish, but that turns out to be an exceedingly short time. C. S. Lewis's authority "was sufficient to ensure that it would be over fifteen years before a group of scholars could begin" to discredit it; but Lewis was a "special case" in that he exerted "a general authority over the entire discipline." 1 '° Lesser authorities apparently have even more sharply circumscribed reigns. " [T] oday the most influential and up-to-date voices," says Fish, "are those that proclaim exactly the reverse" of what was proclaimed less than a decade ago.' 4 1 Fish notes in a postscript to his piece, originally written in 1979, that in 1988 "[i]t is of course now out-of-date, but its out-of-dateness can be seen as extension of my point, that it is the conditions currently obtaining in the profession rather than any set of independent and abiding criteria that determine what is significant and meritorious." 4 2 (After wrestling with the issue at some length, Fish finally concludes that there may be "some point" to reprinting his essay "even nine years later," because its argument is, inexplicably, "still being resisted."") Indeed, Fish even suggests elsewhere that the halflife of "the most influential and up-to-date" literary theories may actually be measured in weekends: "In some places in the United States the appearance of a theoretical manifesto in New Literary History, Diacritics, or Critical Inquiry will be Monday-morning news to which one must respond .... -144
Thus, Fish has succeeded in proving that his own ideas are, if not already obsolete, soon destined to be. At the core of his rather substantial and disabling difficulties is the false dichotomy between an eternal standard set "by God or Aristotle" and no standard at all. What he needs is a theory "of the middle range," as Merton has termed it: "theories that lie between the minor but necessary working hypotheses that evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all-inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that will explain all the observed uniformities."'s
In effect, Fish has over-generalized from a theory that, while perhaps defensible at the-highest level of generality, is irrelevant at the lowest (where he applies it). The fact that one is a Kuhnian in philosophy of science, for example, or an adherent of Habermas in social theory, does not mean that one should abandon the double-blind scientific procedure, discontinue blind grading in the law schools, and give up on blind reviewing. In other words, the fact that science may never be absolutely, positively wertfrei, or that knowledge may ultimately remain inextricably entangled in human interests, does not mean that even the most rudimentary attempts to remove obvious prejudice and bias from the reviewing process are worse than nothing. Presumably Professor Fish does not reserve the highest grades in his courses for, say, "politically correct" students. But why not? On his premises, there is absolutely no reason not to, since bias probably cannot be totally eliminated from the grading process, and one bias is presumably as good as the next (because none of them go to the alleged "merits" anyway) .146 Perhaps Professor Fish will announce in his next article, or course syllabus:
I have finally given up trying to be objective, because it is ultimately (that is, theoretically) impossible, and there is no such thing as "intrinsic merit" anyway, so, from now on, the highest grades in my courses will be reserved for "politically correct" students. This may sound totally biased-and of course it is-but biases are all we have to work with, and at least I am being consistent with my most fundamental theoretical principles (which is very important to me). As Harry Kalven has observed in a legal context, [B] oth sides in any ideological dispute about bringing social science empiricism to law tend to overshoot the mark. On the one hand, it is simplistic to urge that because law makes factual assumptions, there should be a one-to-one linking and testing of the underlying social facts, an endless dropping of empirical footnotes to points of law. On the other hand, it is nonsense to say that better documentation of fact cannot ever be relevant to law because the final business of law is not truth but political preference.
149
And as Fish himself has observed (in a different context),
In the case of either theorist [realist or conventionalist] the answer to the question "How is it that we know what we know?" cannot be translated into a recipe for knowing; you don't use your account of knowing in order to "do" knowing.... Realism and conventionalism are the names of philosophical positions on the question of how it is 146. Cf. Fish, supra note 16, at 660 ("in fact what will really happen is that one set of interested distinctions will be replaced by another"). 
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that we know what we know; they are not the names of epistemological programs that one could self-consciously put into action.Y 1 Saying, with Gandhi, that "man is not capable of knowing the absolute truth and therefore is not competent to punish,"' 5 ' is a little like saying that, since philosophers are still debating Descartes' epistemology, one need not take notice of traffic signals in the meantime (because they might not really exist). Fish acknowledges as much in quoting Moore with approval: "They are skeptics in their explicitly philosophical moments, and realists when it counts in daily living." 5 2 Thus, Fish's (re)considered view seems to be that detailed consistency with highly abstract philosophical theories is neither necessary nor indeed possible-for the judge or, for that matter, anyone else living in the empirical world-and with that I agree. Fish's dogged consistency simply turns out, on closer examination, to obscure a more fundamental inconsistency.
What is needed is a perspective of the middle range, a perspective from which one could say that C. S. Lewis was wrong in 1942 (despite his institutional authority) and still wrong in 1972; or, alternatively (depending on one's analysis), that he was right in 1942 and still right in 1972 (despite his lack of institutional authority). Fish offers no such perspective, and certainly no help, as we attempt to steer our way between "the Scylla of an absolute pursuit of knowledge and the Charybdis of Soviet or Maoist ideology (research in the service of whatever happens to be the current party line) ." 153 In support of his view that intellectual authority "does not exist," Fish states at one point In literary studies, for example, one possible reason for hearkening to an interpretation is the institutional position occupied by the man or woman who proposes it, the fact that he or she has a record of successfully made (that is, influential) arguments, or is known as the editor of a standard text, or is identified with an important "approach," or is highly placed in a professional organization (a department, a professional society), or all of the above .... When a Northrop Frye or ajacques Derrida speaks, it is with all the considerable weight of past achievements, battles fought and won, constituencies created, agendas proposed and enacted .... 1" These people are, Fish adds, "the E. F. Huttons of our profession" (presumably because "when they speak, people listen"). 155 For Fish, the short answer to my critique is that I simply have no business criticizing the "Arts and Sciences Professor of English, Professor of Law, and Chair of the Department of English at Duke University."' 56 The longer (but only slightly longer) answer is that my critique threatens to disrupt what used to be called the "old-boy network" (with all its coniotations of corruption), which for Fish seems to be the primary authoritative medium for the transmission of knowledge.
1 57 Apparently, Fish believes that once Jacques Derrida has won a sufficient number of "battles," and until the institutional structure of authority changes, the playing field will be tilted-and should be tilted-in his favor for subsequent contests (Fish's "benefit of the doubt"). But, quite apart from the inherent implausibility of this belief, one would need to know more specifically what those battles were fought over and how or why they were won, in order to generalize usefully to future contests. Battles are not always won fairly or on the merits (particularly when one side denies that "merit" even exists); the "good guys" do not always prevail. If Fish is talking about anything more than power (he says he is "not proposing anything as crude as 'might makes right"1 5 8), then, if anything, the opposite presumption would seem more plausible. Nothing is more common than the declining bibliographical trajectory of the famous senior scholar who has become, in effect, spoiled by his own fame and whose later, more self-indulgent works pale in comparison with his earlier, more earnest efforts. Compare, for example, Heidegger's
